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THE WTI INCINERATOR: THE RCRA CITIZEN 
SUIT AND THE EMERGENCE OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
HALLIE L. SHIPLEY† 
ABSTRACT 
The WTI Incinerator currently operates in East Liverpool, Ohio, burning toxic 
waste despite a district court ruling that held it posed an imminent and substantial 
risk to both human health and the environment.  Unfortunately for the Ohio 
plaintiffs, the Circuit Court of Appeals in this case misinterpreted the RCRA Citizen 
suit provision, barring any remedy for the Ohio citizens who brought the suit.  This 
flawed interpretation has been adopted nationwide by other Appellate Circuit 
Courts.   
This article compares the remedies available to U.S. citizens for environmental 
harms with those remedies available to the citizens under the European Union Court 
of Justice, the European Court of Human Rights, and the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights, using the WTI Incinerator as a case study.  This article argues that 
Congress needs to rewrite the RCRA citizen suit provision to allow for the remedies 
it originally intended to allow U.S. citizens the same redresses against 
environmental harms enjoyed by those citizens in other international jurisdictions.  
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I.  INTRODUCTION  
On June 9, 2009, residents of East Liverpool, Ohio, looked out their windows to 
see a pink plume on the horizon.
1
  The plume was the result of iodine released from 
the stacks of the Waste Technologies Industries (WTI) hazardous waste incinerator.
2
  
A power outage at the plant caused suppression sprayers, which normally alter the 
chemical to remove the pink color, to fail.
3
  While the Ohio and United States 
Environmental Protection Agencies held a meeting to assure the public that they 
were not in any danger, citizens were not convinced.
4
  Perhaps their skepticism 
stemmed from the numerous safety and legal issues that have plagued WTI since it 
began operations in 1993.
5
   
WTI sits 320 feet from the nearest residence and 1,100 feet from an elementary 
school.
6
  The school is at the same elevation as the top of the emissions stack.
7
  The 
                                                          
 1 Jo Ann Bobby-Gilbert, Pink Plume Was Iodine, Nothing Hazardous, THE REVIEW (East 
Liverpool), (Nov. 20, 2009), http://www.reviewonline.com/page/content.detail/id/ 521231. 
html? nav=5008.    
 2 Id.  
 3 Id. 
 4 Id. 
 5 See Enforcement and Compliance History Online Detail Facility Report for WTI, EPA-
ECHO.GOV (Sept. 1, 2010), http://www.epa-echo.gov/cgi-bin/get1cReport.cgi?tool=echo&ID 
Number=110027242320; Michael D. McElwain, Ohio EPA: Heritage-WTI in Violation of 
Permit, THE REVIEW (East Liverpool) (June 26, 2010), http://www.reviewonline.com/page/ 
content.detail/id/528255.html?nav=5008.  
 6 Ashley Schannauer, Issues in Environmental Law: The WTI Risks Assessments: The 
Need for Effective Public Participation, 24 VT. L. REV. 31, 34 (1999) [hereinafter Schannauer, 
WTI Risk Assessments].  
 7 Id. at 34.  
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facility burns approximately 60,000 pounds of hazardous waste a year.
8
  The school 
has an emergency response plan in the event of an accident at the WTI facility; it 
involves duct tape.
9
  WTI is located on the bank of the Ohio River at the point where 
Ohio, West Virginia, and Pennsylvania meet
10
 and has been the target of both health 
and environmental groups attempting to stop the facility from operating.
11
  These 
groups have used a variety of methods in their fight to get WTI shut down, including 
social protests and seeking legal injunctions.
12
  
In the United States (U.S.), the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 
(RCRA) controls the regulation of hazardous waste.
13
  RCRA includes a provision 
which allows citizens to bring suit against a facility that poses an imminent and 
substantial endangerment to human health or the environment.
14
  However, as this 
article will discuss, because of the way courts have interpreted the RCRA citizen suit 
provision, citizens are often unsuccessful in these suits when challenging a facility 
that has been granted a RCRA permit to operate by the United States Environmental 
Protection Agency (USEPA).  Courts often interpret challenges as collateral attacks 
of a final agency decision, namely the final decision of the USEPA to grant a facility 
a permit.
15
  This interpretation fails to consider that USEPA permit decisions do not 
address a facility‟s possible impact on human health or the environment, which is the 
main focus of a RCRA citizen suit.
16
  Additionally, courts fail to consider that 
                                                          
 8 THOMAS SHEVORY, TOXIC BURN: THE GRASSROOTS STRUGGLE AGAINST THE WTI 
INCINERATOR viii (2007).      
 9 The East End Elementary School‟s emergency response plan involves collecting all 400 
students in the cafeteria, sealing the windows and doors with duct tape and turning off the 
ventilation system so outside air will not enter the building.  This plan seems to assume that 
moving the children and sealing the room can be done quickly enough to prevent hazardous 
gases from entering the room, and that an explosion at WTI will not break any of the 
windows.  L.J. Davis, Where are you Al?: Our “Earth in the Balance” Vice President is 
Unable—or Unwilling—to Stop Even as Dangerous a Project as the Ohio Incinerator, 
MOTHER JONES (Nov./Dec. 1993), http://www.ohiocitizen.org/campaigns/wti/mother 
jones.html.  See also Ashley Schannauer, RCRA Endangerment Actions: Is a Permit a 
Defense?, 21 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 287, 360 n.3 (1996) [hereinafter Schannauer, Permit a 
Defense?]. 
 10 The WTI facility is located at 1250 Saint George Street, East Liverpool, Ohio 43920.  A 
satellite map of the location is available through Google Maps.  GOOGLE MAPS, 
http://www.google.com/maps (enter “1250 Saint George Street, East Liverpool, Ohio 43920” 
into query field and follow “Search Maps” hyperlink).   
 11 These groups include Ohio Citizen Action, Save Our County, and Greenpeace, among 
others.  See generally SHEVORY, supra note 8.   
 12 See generally BENJAMIN DAVY, ESSENTIAL INJUSTICE: WHEN LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 
CANNOT RESOLVE ENVIRONMENTAL AND LAND USE DISPUTES 89-124 (1997). 
 13 42 U.S.C. § 6901 et seq. (1976). 
 14 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a) (1978). 
 15 See Greenpeace v. Waste Tech. Indus., 9 F.3d. 1174 (6th Cir. 1993).  See also Palumbo 
v. Waste Tech. Indus., 989 F.2d 156 (4th Cir. 1993). 
 16 Schannauer, Permit a Defense?, supra note 9, at 339.  
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Congress intended endangerment suits to be under the USEPA‟s authority.17  By 
interpreting this clause so narrowly, courts have limited the use of the RCRA 
endangerment action as a remedy and failed to keep up with Europe in providing 
citizens with environmental legal protections. 
The European Union has taken a broader approach by allowing citizen suits for 
potential health dangers stemming from hazardous wastes and other environmental 
harms.  The European Court of Justice has ruled that the European Union Charter 
grants rights not only to Member States but also to the individual citizens of the 
Member States.
18
  These interpretations provide the European citizens remedies 
when they face a threat to their health and the environment from a hazardous waste 
facility.  The European system is more protective than the U.S. model, and is more 
concerned with preventing harm to the environment or human health.
19
  Under 
European law, a substance is presumed hazardous until it is proven to be safe.
20
  This 
is in direct contrast to the U.S., where a substance is assumed to be safe until it is 
proven hazardous. 
This article will use the WTI case to compare the U.S. and European 
environmental legal systems by analyzing what would have happened in the WTI 
case if European law had been applied.  Part II will give a brief background on the 
U.S. and European legal models as they apply to environmental law suits.  Part III 
will look at how U.S. law was applied to the WTI case.  Part IV will analyze the 
outcome of the WTI case had European law been applied.  Part V will provide a 
conclusion and give recommendations on how the laws of the U.S. could be 
amended to keep pace with changes in global environmental standards. 
II.  BACKGROUND  
This section will discuss the background information necessary to compare the 
U.S. and European laws relevant to environmental lawsuits.  This includes a brief 
history of the RCRA citizen suit legislation, a WTI facility, and an overview of EU 
environmental regulations.  The section will end with a discussion how the Council 
of Europe and the European Court of Human Rights play a role in protecting 
European citizens from environmental harms. 
A.  History of the RCRA and the Citizen Suit Provision 
RCRA is a complicated act.  Agency regulations created to interpret and “clarify” 
it consume over a thousand pages in the Code of Federal Regulations, not including 
the numerous guidance documents printed by both the USEPA and the state agencies 
charged with enforcing the statute.
 21
  RCRA also controls the permits issued to 
hazardous waste facilities.  Although Congress passed RCRA in 1976,
22
 it was not 
                                                          
 17 Id. at 308. 
 18 Id. 
 19 See generally Owen McIntyre & Thomas Mosedale, The Precautionary Principle as a 
Norm of Customary International Law, 9 J. ENVTL. L. 221 (1997).   
 20 Id. 
 21 JOHN W. TEETS, ET AL., RCRA RESOURCE CONSERVATION AND RECOVERY ACT 1 (2003). 
 22 Id. at 4. 
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implemented until 1980, the year Ronald Reagan took office.
23
  Reagan appointed 
Anne Gorsuch to the position of USEPA director.
24
  She was largely considered to 
be an unqualified candidate.
25
  Under her leadership, USEPA enforcement actions 
dropped 75%.
26
  By the time Gorsuch resigned in 1983 over public scandals relating 
to the agency, any confidence Congress or the general public had in the USEPA had 
largely deteriorated.
27
  Reagan appointed new leadership in an attempt to convince 
Congress that his administration was serious about environmental enforcement, but 
the damage to the USEPA‟s reputation had been done.28   
Congress, in response to public distrust of the USEPA‟s ability to enforce 
environmental regulations, passed the Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments in 
1984.
29
  The Amendments contained an expanded citizen suit provision
30
 that allows 
individuals to bring suits to protect themselves from dangers to their health or the 
environment even when the USEPA failed to do so.
31
  The RCRA citizen suit 
provision allows for cases to be brought by individuals as follows: 
(1) (A) against any person . . . alleged to be in violation of any permit, 
standard, regulation, condition, requirement, prohibition, or order which 
has become effective pursuant to this Act . . . ; or 
(B) against any person . . . including any past or present generator, 
past or present transporter, or past or present owner or operator of a 
treatment, storage, or disposal facility, who has contributed or who is 
contributing to the past or present handling, storage, treatment, 
transportation, or disposal of any solid or hazardous waste which may 
present an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the 
environment.
32
  
Although the statute also provides for suits against the USEPA Administrator for 
failing to perform a non-discretionary duty,
33
 this article will limit discussion to the 
                                                          
 23 SHEVORY, supra note 8, at 47. 
 24 Id. 
 25 Id. 
 26 Id. 
 27 Id. at 47-48. 
 28 TEETS, supra note 21, at 5. 
 29 Id. at 6. 
 30 Schannauer, Permit a Defense?, supra note 9, at 308.  The Hazardous and Solid Waste 
Amendments of 1984 expanded the citizen suit provision to include subsection (1)(B) 
included above, which allowed citizens to bring suit against facilities which posed an 
imminent and substantial threat to human health and the environment.  Hazardous and Solid 
Waste Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-616, 98 Stat. 3269.  Prior to these amendments, 
citizen suits were limited to actions against facilities in violation of a permit and suits against 
the USEPA Administrator for failing to perform a non-discretionary duty.  Id.  
 31 Jonathan York, The Next Step in Revitalizing RCRA: Maine People’s Alliance and the 
Importance of Citizen Intervention in EPA Actions, 35 ECOLOGY L.Q. 405, 406 (2008). 
 32 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1) (emphasis added). 
 33 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(2). 
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two types of suits listed above as the portions of the statute pertinent to the WTI 
facility citizen suits.  First, the “permit suits,” brought under 42 U.S.C. § 
6972(a)(1)(A) which allow for cases to be brought against individuals that are in 
violation of either RCRA itself, or a permit issued by the USEPA.  Second, the 
“endangerment suits,” brought under 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B) which allow for 
cases to be brought against facilities that pose an imminent and substantial 
endangerment to health or the environment.  Courts‟ interpretations of the 
endangerment suit provision have been so narrow as to bar most actions, as 
discussed in more detail below.   
Since RCRA was passed in 1976, the United States has fallen behind Europe in 
its efforts to protect the environment.
34
  The U.S. currently has no federal regulations 
targeting climate change or greenhouse gas emissions, unlike the EU which adopted 
the Kyoto Protocol in March 2002 and has worked collectively to limit carbon 
emissions.
35
  U.S. states have attempted to regulate their own environments through 
more stringent state standards,
36
 to differing degrees of success.
37
  But when states 
attempted to control waste within their borders by restricting garbage “imports,” 
federal courts found the restrictions violated the Commerce Clause and were 
unconstitutional.
38
  States have also passed a number of measures to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions.
39
  Despite these state measures,
40
 the U.S. government 
has not passed any federal climate change legislation, and climate change cannot be 
adequately addressed at the state level.
41
   
The legislative intent behind passing the RCRA citizen suit provision was to 
allow citizen enforcement to parallel the USEPA‟s enforcement authority.42  
Allowing citizens to bring suits directly against a facility that poses an imminent and 
substantial harm to their health or the environment, rather than merely reporting the 
risk to the USEPA, reflects Congress‟ fear that USEPA enforcement actions might 
be inadequate.
43
  With multiple state and federal agencies asserting control over 
                                                          
 34 Erin Walter, The Supreme Court Goes Dormant When Desperate Times Call for 
Desperate Measures: Looking to the European Union for a Lesson in Environmental 
Protection, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1161, 1161 (1996). 
 35 David Vogel, Michael Toffel, Diahanna Post & Nazli Z. Uludere Aragon, 
Environmental Federalism in the European Union and the United States 13-16 (Harvard Bus. 
Sch. Working Paper, Paper No. 10-085, 2010), available at http://www.hbs.edu/ 
research/pdf/10-085.pdf.  
 36 Walter, supra note 34, at 1163. 
 37 California now has the most stringent automobile emissions standards compared to the 
rest of the nation and has become a leader in encouraging the development of zero-emission 
vehicles.  Vogel, supra note 35, at 4. 
 38 Id. 
 39 As of 2003, there were approximately 700 state policies aimed at reducing greenhouse 
gas emissions.  Id. at 23. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. at 13-15. 
 42 Schannauer, Permit a Defense?, supra note 9, at 308. 
 43 Id.  
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hazardous waste facility permits and regulations, it is possible for gaps in regulations 
to occur or for problems with a facility to get overlooked.  WTI provides an example 
of how these gaps can occur. 
B.  RCRA and the WTI Facility 
Permit proceedings for WTI began in 1982 and were conducted by the Ohio 
Hazardous Waste Facility Approval Board, the Ohio Environmental Protection 
Agency (OEPA) and the USEPA.
44
  The 1,000 citizens that participated in the first 
hearing were permitted five minutes each to voice their objections to the siting
45
 of 
the facility and the possible health risks it would pose.
46
  Despite numerous 
objections from these citizens, the USEPA issued WTI a RCRA permit in 1983.
47
  
After the USEPA issued the RCRA permit to WTI, the Ohio Hazardous Waste 
Facility Board received objections from both state and county officials, as well as 
from 19,000 county residents in the form of a petition.
48
  In spite of these objections, 
the State of Ohio issued WTI the various state permits needed to operate in 1983 and 
1984.
49
  
While WTI met all of the relevant USEPA standards for a RCRA permit, USEPA 
standards for hazardous waste incinerators are largely based on their technological 
capabilities, rather than the potential health risks.
50
  The USEPA acknowledges that 
its standards may not protect human health or the environment because agency 
standards are based on a limited knowledge of the possible health effects of the 
chemicals emitted and limited technical capabilities to actually monitor the 
emissions.
51
  Not all of the compounds released by hazardous waste incinerators 
have been identified, and some released compounds, such as dioxins
52
 and furans, 
are more hazardous than the waste in its original state before incineration.
53
  
Although the Clean Air Act does provide an additional set of regulations by 
controlling air emissions, the regulations are inadequate because the Act is only 
concerned with a very limited number of pollutants.
54
  Some experts believe that 
environmental harms go unregulated because Congress tends to over-rely on 
                                                          
 44 DAVY, supra note 12, at 93. 
 45 “Site” is defined as a prospective location for something, particularly a public building 
or industrial plant.  BALLENTINE‟S‟S LAW DICTIONARY (3rd ed. 2010) (LEXIS).  
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id.   
 49 Schannauer, WTI Risk Assessments, supra note 6, at n. 47. 
 50 Schannauer, Permit a Defense?, supra note 9, at 329. 
 51 Id. at 332. 
 52 The type of dioxin released by WTI is considered the most potent carcinogen and the 
most potent reproductive toxin ever evaluated by the USEPA.  Greenpeace v. Waste Tech. 
Industries, No. 4:93CV083, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5001, at *47-49 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 5, 
1993). 
 53 Schannauer, Permit a Defense?, supra note 9, at 332-33. 
 54 Id. at 338. 
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scientific evidence when forming environmental legislation.
55
  Congressional 
overreliance on scientific evidence is especially problematic because scientific data 
is not always available to address all the issues that may be relevant to a specific 
piece of legislation.
56
  Because RCRA performance standards do not regulate the 
emission of dangerous substances like dioxin or mercury, there is no relevant part of 
the USEPA permit process that addresses the impact of the substances on human 
health or the environment.
57
  The permit process is inadequate to address citizen‟s 
concerns about possible health risks from a hazardous waste facility. 
One of the primary objections opponents have to WTI is that it is located too 
close to schools and homes.  Unfortunately, not one of the many state or federal 
agencies involved in issuing permits to WTI conducted a comprehensive 
examination of whether the site was suitable for a hazardous waste incinerator.
58
  
Siting of a hazardous waste facility is controlled by local governments through 
zoning ordinances.
59
  In 1967, local authorities zoned the land where WTI would 
later be sited for general industrial activities.
60
  The land was originally intended to 
be a port for the city of East Liverpool.
61
  But there is a big difference between the 
environmental impact of a port and the environmental impact of a hazardous waste 
incinerator.   
Under federal law, the only relevant siting criteria to the USEPA are the facility‟s 
proximity to flood plains, salt domes, underground mines, or seismically hazardous 
locations.
62
  There is nothing in the USEPA regulations that forbids a hazardous 
waste incinerator from being located in a residential area.
63
  However, a report by the 
federal General Accounting Office found problems with the federal floodplain 
regulations and the WTI site on the Ohio River, even within the limited scope of the 
USEPA‟s siting criteria.64  Perhaps as a response to some of these siting problems, 
soon after Ohio issued WTI a permit to operate, the state amended its permit 
standards to exclude hazardous waste facilities from locations near homes or 
schools.
65
 
While the state and federal permits were issued in 1983 and 1984, due to changes 
in WTI‟s ownership, construction did not begin until 1990 and was completed in 
                                                          
 55 See generally Wendy E. Wagner, Congress, Science, and Environmental Policy, 1999 
U. ILL. L. REV. 181 (1999). 
 56 Id. at 181-83. 
 57 Schannauer, Permit a Defense?, supra note 9, at 340. 
 58 DAVY, supra note 12, at 125. 
 59 See generally State Law and Programs under RCRA, 4-25B Zoning and Land Use 
Controls § 25B.17 (MB) (2011). 
 60 DAVY, supra note 12, at 124. 
 61 Id. 
 62 Schannauer, Permit a Defense?, supra note 9, at 337. 
 63 Id.   
 64 DAVY, supra note 12, at 125-26. 
 65 Id. at 95. 
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1992.
66
  In November 1992, shakedown
67
 operations began.
68
  In March of 1993, the 
eight-day trial burn occurred in which the USEPA tested the facility‟s ability to meet 
emission regulations.
69
  WTI did not meet emission regulations.
70
  Despite this 
failure, the USEPA allowed WTI to continue with the post-trial burn, a period that 
follows the test burn and lasts until final operating conditions for the facility are 
established by the USEPA, typically lasting one to two years.
71
  The USEPA then 
decided not to establish final operating conditions until the results of the risk 
assessment were available.
72
  Because of this decision, the WTI post trial burn period 
lasted until January 25, 1995, when WTI‟s initial RCRA permit expired without final 
operating conditions ever being established.
73
  When the risk assessment was finally 
released on May 8, 1997, approximately fourteen years after the initial RCRA permit 
was issued, it found that cancer risks were within acceptable limits and that non-
cancer health effects were not expected.
74
  The positive risk assessment allowed WTI 
operations to continue uninterrupted.
75
 
C.  History of EU Environmental Regulations 
The European Union (EU), with its multiple levels of government, functions 
using a similar form of federalism as the United States.
76
  The European Parliament 
(Parliament) functions as Congress would in the United States.
77
  Its members are 
elected by the citizens of the Member States of the European Union and it is 
responsible for drafting legislation.
78
  In much the same way the Senate and the 
House of Representatives share legislative duties in the U.S., the Parliament shares 
its legislative duties with the Council of Ministers (Ministers).
79
  The Ministers can 
use different instruments to enact laws, the most important being directives and 
                                                          
 66 Schannauer, WTI Risk Assessments, supra note 6, at 44. 
 67 “Shakedown” is the term used to describe initial pretest burning.  SHEVORY, supra note 
8, at 128.      
 68 Schannauer, WTI Risk Assessments, supra note 6, at 44. 
 69 Id. at 44-45. 
 70 Id. at 45. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. 
 73 Schannauer, Permit a Defense?, supra note 9, at 341. 
 74 Schannauer, WTI Risk Assessments, supra note 6, at 35. 
 75 Id.  The conditions of an expired EPA permit continue in force until the effective date of 
the new permit.  40 C.F.R. § 270.51(a) (2005). 
 76 Walter, supra note 34, at 1173. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Welcome to the European Parliament, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, http://www.europarl. 
europa.eu/parliament/public/staticDisplay.do;jsessionid=9DFDE58167A8C14A5AA87896AF
7DDD17.node2?id=146&language=en (last visited Mar. 8, 2011). 
 79 See JANET R. HUNTER & ZACHARY A. SMITH, PROTECTING OUR ENVIRONMENT: LESSONS 
FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION 37-39 (2005).   
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regulations, to be discussed in more detail below.
80
  The civil service of the EU is the 
European Commission, which is charged with implementing policies, enforcing 
laws, and allocating funds.
81
  It also holds some legislative functions in the form of 
drafting proposals for new laws, although it does not have the power to pass the 
legislation.
82
  Citizens may lodge a complaint with the Court if the European 
Parliament, Ministers, or Commission fails to make a decision required by any EU 
Treaty.
83
  Citizens may also petition Parliament on any matter that affects citizens 
directly and falls within the purview of the EU.
84
  A committee within Parliament 
reviews the petitions, considers any evidence, holds hearings, and then submits a 
report to the rest of Parliament with the outcomes.
85
  This provides citizens one 
avenue to get their cause before the EU outside of the courts.   
The European Court of Justice (ECJ) acts as the judicial branch of the EU.
86
  It is 
assisted in its duties by the Court of First Instance (CFI), created in 1988 to be 
responsible for giving rulings on cases brought by individuals, companies, and those 
relating to competition law.
87
   The CFI was created to ease the case load of the ECJ 
to allow EU citizens greater access to legal protection.
88
  The ECJ itself has 
jurisdiction over cases against Member States for failing to fulfill their obligations 
under EU law, which may be brought by either the European Commission 
(Commission) or, less frequently, by one Member State against another.
89
  Citizens 
can bring an action for damages before the ECJ if they have suffered as a result of 
the action or inaction of the EU.
90
  However, a citizen cannot bring an action before 
the ECJ against a Member State for a failure to fulfill an obligation that the state has 
under EU law, which is left to the discretion of the Commission.
91
   
The EU did not begin enacting environmental legislation until after the U.S., 
primarily because the Treaty of Rome, which created the EU,
92
 did not initially 
contain a provision for environmental regulation.
93
  But once the Single European 
                                                          
 80 Id. at 37-38. 
 81 Id. at 33. 
 82 Id.   
 83 The Court of Justice of the European Union, EUROPA, http://europa.eu/institutions/inst/ 
justice/index_en.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2011) [hereinafter Court of Justice]. 
 84  Hunter, supra note 79, at 39. 
 85 Id. at 39-40. 
 86 Court of Justice, supra note 83. 
 
 87 Id. 
 
 88 Id. 
 89 Curia Court of Justice Presentation, CURIA, http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/Jo2_7024/ 
(last visited Nov. 7, 2011). 
 90 Court of Justice, supra note 86. 
 91 Id.    
 92 Celebrating Europe! 50th Anniversary of the Treaty of Rome, EUROPA, 
http://europa.eu/50/index_en.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2011).   
 93 Vogel, supra note 35, at 2. 
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Act94 was passed in 1987, environmental regulation increased because there was a 
clear legal basis for environmental legislation.
95
  The Act added a new title to the 
Treaty, headed “Environment,” which set Community objectives on the 
environment.
96
  Since this Act, the EU has implemented several policies to mitigate 
climate change.
97
  In 2002, the EU obliged each member state to adopt the Kyoto 
Protocol, which was signed by the U.S. but was never sent to the Senate for 
ratification.
98
  The treaty requires that emissions be reduced to 8% below 1990 levels 
by 2012.
99
  Although Member States still have the power to issue permits to 
industries that create emissions, the EU asks that the number of permits issued 
complies with the Kyoto Protocol.
100
  Additionally, Community Directives require 
that Member States only grant licenses to industrial plants which apply the best 
available technology.
101
  Because the EU‟s constitutional authority is only about two 
decades old, it is sensitive to the impact different state standards will have on the 
market and seems less willing to accept divergent environmental standards than the 
U.S.
102
 
The European Parliament passed Directive 76/2000 on December 4, 2000, which 
regulates the incineration of waste.
103
  This Directive is the most recent update by the 
legislature to the EU laws regulating the incineration of waste dating back to 
1989.
104
  Much like RCRA, the Directive requires facilities to apply for and obtain 
permits.
105
  While the Directive does not contain a specific provision that allows for 
suits to be brought against the operators of facilities for posing a danger to health or 
                                                          
 94 Single European Act, 1987 O.J. (L 169) 1, http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/ 
emu_history/documents/treaties/singleuropeanact.pdf (last visited Jan. 23, 2012). 
 95 Vogel, supra note 35, at 2. 
 96 Francis Jacobs, The Role of the European Court of Justice in the Protection of the 
Environment, 18 J. ENVTL. L. 185, 186 (2006).  
 97 Vogel, supra note 35, at 15. 
 98 Id. at 22, 30. 
 99 Id. at 15. 
 100 Id. at 15-16. 
 101 McIntyre, supra note 19, at 231; Council Directive 2006/118/EC, 2006 O.J. (L 372) 19. 
 102 Vogel, supra note 35, at 35. 
 103 Council Directive 2000/76/EC, 2000 O.J. (L 332) 91 [hereinafter Incineration 
Directive]. 
 104 Waste Incineration Summary of Legislation, EUROPA, http://europa.eu/legislation_ 
summaries/environment/waste_management/l28072_en.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2011). 
 105  See Incineration Directive, supra note 102.  The European Union requires facilities to, 
as much as possible, capture the heat generated during the incineration process to be used to 
create electricity.  Although WTI was first advertised as a heat-to-energy plant, WTI has 
generated no electricity as of 2008.  SHEVORY, supra note 9, at 76.  See also Jason Bourne, 
WTI, A Toxic Incinerator 1,100 Feet From an Ohio Elementary School, Hillary and Bill, 
PROGRESSOHIO COMMUNITY BLOG, http://www.progressohio.org/blog/2008/02/C3Z4.html 
(last visited Nov. 7, 2011).  There is no information about any heat-to-energy recovery on the 
WTI company website.  HERITAGE-WTI, www.heritage-wti.com (last visited Nov. 7, 2011). 
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the environment,
106
 suits can be brought against these facilities using other means, to 
be discussed in detail below.   
Perhaps one reason the EU has been able to make such strides in environmental 
regulation is its adoption of the “precautionary principal.”107  The precautionary 
principal is based on the idea that “[w]here there are threats of serious or irreversible 
damage, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing 
cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.”108  It is a rejection of 
the traditional “assimilative capacity approach” which is based on the assumption 
that science could determine the environment‟s capacity and could sufficiently 
mitigate threats to capacity before there is irreparable environmental damage.
109
  The 
problem with the assimilative capacity approach is that sometimes scientific 
certainty comes too late, which is why international law has recently seen a shift 
towards the better-safe-than-sorry precautionary approach.
110
  In the 1992 
amendments to the Treaty of Rome, the requirement was included that all 
environmental policy in the EU shall be based on the precautionary principle.
111
  
Because of this amendment, environmental citizen suits brought in the EU face a 
lower burden of proof than plaintiffs in the U.S., who must prove the specific cause 
for the environmental harm complained of. 
D.  The Council of Europe and Human Rights 
The Treaty of London established the Council of Europe in 1949.
112
  In contrast 
to the European Union, whose goal was to unify Europe through purely economic 
means, the Council of Europe (Council) aimed to unify the continent through 
broader social, political, and cultural means.
113
  To help fulfill these goals, the 
Council formed the European Convention on Human Rights (Convention) in 1950, 
which entered into force in 1953.
114
  The Convention can be amended through 
protocols, which add rights to the Convention and allow it to evolve.
115
  The 
Convention created the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in 1959, which 
consists of one judge per member state.
116
   
                                                          
 106 See generally Incineration Directive, supra note 102.   
 107 McIntyre, supra note 19, at 230. 
 108 Id. at 229.  
 109 Id. at 221-22. 
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 111 Id. at 230. 
 112 HOWARD DAVIS, HUMAN RIGHTS LAW DIRECTIONS 16 (1st ed. 2007). 
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 115 ECHR in 50, supra note 113, at 5.  Protocols bind only the states that ratify them 
individually.  Id. 
 116 HOWARD DAVIS, supra note 111, at 17; ECHR in 50, supra note 113, at 6.  Originally, a 
European Commission of Human Rights was created which decided the cases the ECHR 
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Cases are brought before the ECHR when one state brings a case against another 
state for human rights violations or, more commonly, when an individual brings suit 
against their own state.
117
  A case before the ECHR proceeds through two stages.
118
  
In the first stage, a single judge will determine whether the case can proceed, 
considering whether the application meets certain admissibility requirements.
119
  
These requirements include the exhaustion of domestic remedies, that the complaint 
falls under the Convention, and that all procedural requirements have been met.
120
  If 
all requirements are met, the case will proceed to the second stage where the ECHR 
will make a determination on the merits.
121
  The case will be heard by a panel of 
seven judges which must include the judge representing the state against which the 
case has been lodged.
122
  The rulings are enforced by the Ministers of the Council of 
Europe who work with the state to decide how to execute the judgment and prevent 
further violations.
123
 
III.  ANALYSIS  
This section will begin by discussing the ways citizens may get an environmental 
suit heard in the U.S., the EU, and before the ECHR.  It will analyze the way the 
RCRA statute was applied in the two citizen suits brought against the WTI facility, 
and then proceed with a discussion on how the WTI suits may have turned out if 
European law had been applied.  Next, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
and how its provisions may apply to the United States will be discussed. 
A.  The RCRA Endangerment Suit Provision 
The RCRA endangerment suit provision, which allows citizens to bring suits 
against facilities that pose an imminent and substantial threat to human health and 
the environment, may seem generous to plaintiffs, but it bars citizen suits in two 
important areas.
124
  First, it does not allow challenges to the siting of a treatment, 
storage, or disposal facility.
125
  This leaves citizens with only the comment period 
provided by the USEPA during the permit process to challenge the proposed site of a 
facility.  While parties may appeal the decision of the USEPA if it does issue a 
permit, this remedy is not equivalent to a RCRA citizen suit.  An appeal of an 
                                                          
would hear, but it was abolished in 1998 and the Court now decides for itself which cases will 
be heard.  HOWARD DAVIS, supra note 111, at 19. 
 117 Only states that have ratified the Convention can have cases brought against them 
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4 ENVTL. L. § 7.6 (2010). 
 125 Id. 
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agency decision, such as the decision to issue a permit,
126
 is controlled by the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and the appeal will go to the appropriate 
Circuit Court, rather than the District Court where a RCRA suit would be brought.
127
  
At the Circuit Court level, the APA requires deference be given to agency 
expertise.
128
  In contrast, no deference is given to an agency decision in a RCRA 
citizen suit.
129
  Without the deference to an agency‟s expertise, a suit brought under 
RCRA has a lower burden of proof for plaintiffs than a suit brought under the APA. 
Second, the permit process focuses on a facility‟s ability to comply with 
technical performance standards, while endangerment actions focus on a facility‟s 
impact on human health or the environment.
130
  It is possible for a facility to comply 
with all technical standards and still pose a threat to human health.
131
  Because 
endangerment suits raise issues that are not directly addressed in permit proceedings, 
they should not be barred as a collateral attack of an agency decision.
132
 
One possible reason the USEPA is given preference when a citizen appeals a 
permit decision under the Administrative Procedure Act is because of the many steps 
and requirements a facility must meet in order to obtain a valid RCRA permit.  Any 
facility involved in the treatment, storage or disposal of hazardous waste must 
maintain a valid RCRA permit to legally operate.
133
  The process a facility must 
undergo to obtain a permit includes an informal meeting with the public, and 
preparing and submitting an application to the USEPA.
134
  The USEPA will review 
the applications and prepare a draft permit, which will be submitted to the public for 
public comment.
135
  After the close of the public comment period, a final permit is 
issued that incorporates all the terms imposed on a facility for it to comply with 
relevant RCRA conditions.
136
  RCRA permits are valid for a period of ten years, 
although the USEPA has wide discretion to modify the terms of the permit whenever 
necessary to protect human health and the environment.
137
 
                                                          
 126 42 U.S.C. § 6976. 
 127 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq. (1993). 
 128 Schannauer, Permit a Defense?, supra note 9, at 345. 
 129 42 U.S.C. § 6976. 
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2012] THE WTI INCINERATOR 207 
 
1.  The Burford Abstention Doctrine 
The Burford abstention doctrine is sometimes applied to environmental suits.
138
  
The doctrine mandates the dismissal of a case by federal court if a complex state 
regulatory scheme is central to the lawsuit.
139
  When determining whether to abstain 
under Burford, federal courts should consider: (1) whether the suit is based on a 
cause of action which is exclusively federal; (2) whether difficult or unusual state 
laws are at issue; (3) whether there is a need for coherent state doctrine in the area; 
and, (4) whether state procedures indicate a desire to create a special state forum for 
adjudication.
140
  The types of complex regulatory schemes where Burford is usually 
applied are cases where the state scheme requires unified state administration, and 
there is specialized state court review available.
141
  A central factor for courts 
granting abstention is how important the state law is to the state and whether the 
issue transcends the case at bar.
142
  Abstention is unwarranted when the case can be 
fully resolved applying federal law.
143
 
B.  The European Court of Justice 
The European Court of Justice (ECJ) is based in Luxembourg and made up of 
one judge from each Member State.
144
  It settles disputes between Member States, 
EU institutions, and individuals, and makes sure that EU legislations is interpreted 
and applied consistently throughout the EU.
145
  Although the Single European Act 
gave the ECJ the jurisdiction to hear environmental cases, the court was ruling on 
cases affecting the environment in the name of regulating trade and the free 
movement of goods before that Act was passed.
146
  In a 1985 case, two years before 
the Single European Act, the ECJ ruled that although maintaining the free movement 
of goods was vital, it was not absolute.
147
  Instead, it determined that certain limits 
on trade could be justified if they were in the interest of pursuing community 
                                                          
 138 Like many jurisdictional doctrines, this doctrine is named after the case in which it first 
appeared.  Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943).   
 139 James L. Buchwalter, Propriety of Federal Court’s Abstention, Under Burford v. Sun 
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objectives, such as the protection of the environment.
148
  This was the first time that 
the protection of the environment was stated as an objective of the EU, and was a 
departure from the court‟s earlier approach which stressed economic integration 
above all else.
149
  The ECJ issued this ruling in favor of environmental protection 
before there was an explicit legal basis for them to do so.
150
 
When determining whether a measure that restricts free trade in the name of 
environmental protection is reasonable, the ECJ and the courts of the Member States 
evaluate environmental protection measures using a two-tier approach.
151
  First, the 
court asks whether the environmental objective is acceptable.
152
  If it is acceptable, 
the court looks to see whether the measure achieves the environmental objective 
while minimizing restrictions on free trade and competition.
153
  The EU expressly 
prohibits restrictions on the movement of goods between Member States, unlike the 
U.S. Constitution which does not.
154
  However, the U.S. Supreme Court has 
interpreted the Commerce Clause to prohibit state restrictions on interstate 
commerce.
155
   
Unfortunately, because most environmental legislation is laid out in the form of 
directives, the role of citizen suits is limited.
156
  The ECJ does not allow private 
parties to use legislation set out in directives against another private party.
157
  
Directives impose minimum requirements on Member States, but give them 
discretion as to the way the directive is carried out.
158
  As long as the desired result 
of the directive is achieved, the Member States have fulfilled their obligations.
159
  A 
regulation, in contrast, sets out both the result to be achieved as well as the method 
for achieving that result.
160
  Because directives leave much more discretion up to 
Member States, they are often adopted more frequently than other forms of 
legislation because they allow states with different views to reach a consensus more 
easily.
161
  Citizens can still bring cases against the EU for their action or inaction, but 
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the use of directives severely limits horizontal private enforcement relating to 
environmental laws.
162
   
1.  Citizen Standing Before the ECJ 
Effective citizen enforcement of EU environmental law depends on whether a 
citizen can invoke EU law when bringing a case within a Member State.  There are 
three doctrines which allow a citizen to invoke EU law within a Member State: 
direct effect, consistent enforcement, and state liability.
163
  The direct effect doctrine 
is the most pertinent to environmental enforcement and applies to those aspects of 
EU law that are enforceable within Member States even if that Member State does 
not have a specific national law speaking to the provision.
164
  The direct effect 
doctrine is a doctrine that allows a citizen to invoke EU law within the courts of a 
Member State.
165
  Under the doctrine of direct effect, the ECJ has ruled that the EU 
intends to confer certain rights to individuals that can be enforced in national courts 
if the provisions of EU law are both unconditional and sufficiently precise.
166
  But 
because most environmental legislation is set out in directives, and directives are 
intentionally imprecise because they leave implementation up to the Member States, 
the direct effect doctrine is of limited use for private citizens bringing environmental 
citizen suits.
167
  Horizontal direct effect actions, those brought by one group or 
citizen against another group or citizen, are very limited because they are seen as too 
great an interference in the Member States‟ systems.168  But the ECJ has allowed for 
“horizontal side effects” when citizens bring vertical direct effect cases, which occur 
when a private group or citizen brings a case against a government entity.
169
  This 
would allow a citizen to challenge the decision of a regulatory agency such as a 
decision to issue a permit, a vertical direct effect action with the horizontal side 
effect that the facility‟s permit could be revoked.170  This is in direct contrast to the 
U.S. law under RCRA, which allows a citizen to challenge the facility horizontally if 
it poses an imminent threat to human health and the environment but gives deference 
to agency decisions under the APA.
171 
 
Another way individual citizens can get their case before the ECJ is by lodging 
complaints with the Commission.
172
  The Commission brought action against Ireland 
                                                          
 162 Court of Justice, supra note 83; Van Zeben, supra note 155, at 242. 
 163 Van Zeben, supra note 155, at 250. 
 164 See id. 
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for a failure to fulfill their obligations under a directive on waste because of a series 
of complaints received by Irish citizens between 1997 and 2000.
173
  The purpose of 
the waste directive was to ensure that waste is disposed of without endangering 
human health or the environment.
174
  A total of twelve complaints were received, all 
concerning the unauthorized dumping of waste.
175
  Ireland failed to respond to the 
Commission‟s formal notices regarding the complaints.176  The ECJ found that 
Ireland‟s failure to comply with the waste directive was persistent and widespread, 
and that it had failed to establish a national network of waste disposal that did not 
endanger human health or the environment.
177
  
2.  Greenpeace v. Commission 
Greenpeace, a private entity, brought suit against the Commission as a vertical 
direct effect suit with potential horizontal direct effect consequences.
178
  In March 
1991, the Commission agreed to provide financial assistance to Spain for the 
construction of two power plants which were to be located on the Canary Islands.
179
  
Financial assistance would be provided in the amount of approximately ECU 
108,000,000 with payments to be spread over four years.
180
  Part of the agreement 
provided that payments would be suspended or reduced if irregularities in 
construction were found or if there were any changes in the plans which were not 
approved by the Commission in advance.
181
  In December 1991, two individual 
citizens sent a letter to the Commission saying that no environmental impact 
assessment study had been performed as required under EU law.
182
  Two 
environmental impact statements were later issued in December 1992 by the Canary 
Islands Commission for Planning and the Environment.
183
  Based on the impact 
statements, Greenpeace challenged the EU‟s decision to continue funding the 
project.
184
  The EU Commission‟s Director General upheld the decision to provide 
funds by saying that its decisions were made after full consultation with those 
concerned.
185
  Greenpeace appealed to the CFI, which upheld the Commission‟s 
decision to continue funding.
 186
  In its order the CFI found Greenpeace and 
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associated individual citizens did not have standing to bring the action, and 
distinguished between individuals and environmental associations.
187
   
Greenpeace appealed the CFI‟s decision to the ECJ,188 which proceeded with an 
in-depth analysis on the issue of standing in EU law.
189
  EU case law had limited 
standing for individuals to issues that affect them “by reason of certain attributes that 
are peculiar to them,” distinguishing them from the general population as the person 
to whom the legislation is addressed.
190
  In this case, the applicants would be 
affected by any court decision in this case in the same way that all other residents of 
the Canary Islands would be.
191
  However, the CFI had failed to consider the effect 
of the recently revised Article 173 of the EU Treaty, which provided that any legal 
person may institute proceedings if they hold a legal interest affected by the 
contested act or decision.
192
  Greenpeace argued that this rewritten Article 173 
confers rights on people who may be concerned with EU projects, such as the 
Canary Islands project, that significantly affect the environment.
193
   
The ECJ upheld the decision of the CFI.
194
  Standing, in an environmental suit, is 
based on whether the individual‟s quality of life will be affected by the decision, and 
in this case it was not clear how the individual‟s quality of life would each be 
affected.
195
  It expressed concern that if it were to allow standing for environmental 
groups generally, then individuals who did not have standing would get around this 
by creating an environmental group.
196
  Moreover, if environmental groups were 
able to challenge every law that had an impact on the environment there would be an 
endless amount of litigation.
197
  If the ECJ had found that Greenpeace and the 
individual appellants had standing, it would have significantly liberalized the 
standing requirements for environmental plaintiffs.
198
   
C.  European Court of Human Rights 
The European Convention on Human Rights (Convention), signed in 1950, 
contains no provision that expressly provides for the protection of the 
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environment.
199
  But in 1990, the Council of Europe went on to adopt the Dublin 
Declaration on “The Environmental Imperative” stating that Community action 
“must be to guarantee citizens the right to a clean and healthy environment.”200  And 
by 1993, the ECHR was willing to allow for creative arguments to be made that 
environmental protection fell under one of the existing Articles.
201
  The court hears 
environmental cases primarily under Article 8, the right to respect for home and 
private life, but has considered cases argued under Article 1, the right to peaceful 
enjoyment of possessions; Article 2, the right to life; and Article 10, the right to 
freedom of expression.
202
  Bringing a case before the ECHR does require the 
exhaustion of domestic remedies much like the other courts discussed.
203
  
Environmental human rights under the Convention differs from other human rights 
concerns because environmental protection is often pursued as being in the best 
interest of all, as opposed to other human rights that focus on the interest of the 
individual.
204
  This can be a limitation for plaintiffs because the human rights system 
is designed to protect individuals, rather than society generally.
205
 
1.  State as Environmental Protector 
Individuals also bring suit before the ECHR when a State, in attempting to 
protect the environment, acts to violate an individual‟s property interest.206  A 
primary example is when permits, such as fishing or building permits, are denied or 
revoked in the interest of environmental protection, such as preserving fish stocks or 
green space.
207
  These suits are often brought under Article 1, the right to property.
208
  
But, if the permit applicant felt they were denied a fair hearing before their permit 
was revoked or denied, they may bring the case under Article 6, the right to a fair 
trial.
209
  The right to a fair trial is a procedural rather than a substantive right, but 
procedural rights can be just as effective as substantive rights in determining the 
outcome of a case.  
In deciding cases where an individual brings suit against a State for a human 
rights violation in the name of environmental protection, the ECHR must weigh the 
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competing interests between the duties of the State to protect the environment for all 
and the rights of the individual.
210
  First, the ECHR determines whether the State 
acted lawfully based on its own internal law.
211
  Second, the ECHR determines 
whether the State acted with a legitimate purpose.
212
  A legitimate purpose is widely 
defined as anything in the public interest, and the ECHR has given States a great 
deal of discretion.
213
  The ECHR, by accepting the protection of the environment as 
a legitimate government purpose, has expanded and legitimized the States‟ role in 
environmental protection.
214
  Finally, the ECHR attempts to balance the competing 
interests of the State and the individual, specifically looking to whether the 
individual has to bear a disproportionate and excessive burden.
215
 
2.  State Fails to Provide Environmental Protection 
Another type of environmental suit brought before the ECHR is when an 
individual brings suit against a State for failing to take the necessary steps to protect 
individuals from environmental harms.
216
  In these cases, the ECHR does not grant 
the States a great deal of discretion.
217
  Rather, it takes a strict approach to State 
actions and looks at whether they were strictly necessary to achieve the government 
purpose.
218
  The State‟s justification for their actions is generally economic, and 
economic justifications are not seen as sufficient by the ECHR.
219
  The ECHR will 
consider whether there were any alternatives the State could have implemented that 
would have prevented the environmental harm.
220
  If an alternative exists, then the 
State‟s actions would not have been strictly necessary and a human rights violation 
would have occurred.
221
   
One ECHR case involving the protection of the environment is Giacomelli v. 
Italy.
222
  Giacomelli, an individual citizen of Italy, brought complaint against the 
Italian Republic in 1998 for failing to protect her right to respect for her home and 
private life under Article 8.
223
  Giacomelli lived about 100 feet away from the 
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Ecoservizi plant, which specialized in the treatment and storage of hazardous and 
non-hazardous waste.
224
  Ecoservizi began operating in 1982, and its license 
expanded in 1989 to include the detoxification of waste, which involved treating the 
hazardous waste with other chemicals.
225
  Between 1991 and 1999, Ecoservizi‟s 
license was further expanded to allow for an increase in the quantity of waste it 
processed and its license was also renewed a number of times, which Giacomelli 
continuously challenged in Italian courts.
226
  Plaintiff claimed an environmental 
impact assessment, very similar to the USEPA risk assessment, should have been 
completed prior to a license being issued but was not completed until 1996, seven 
years after Ecoservizi began operations.
227
  The Italian Regional EPA also found 
high levels of ammonia in the atmosphere indicating a failure in the plant‟s 
detoxification process.
228
  The Italian authorities argued that it had not been proven 
that the facility was dangerous.
229
  The ECHR ruled that authorities cannot wait until 
comprehensive data is available for each and every aspect of the matter to act, and 
found in favor of Giacomelli in the amount of approximately $15,000 plus attorney 
fees.
230
 
3.  Limitations of the ECHR 
Although the ECHR can be a powerful tool for a plaintiff faced with an 
environmental danger, it is not without its limitations.  Only about five to fifteen 
percent of cases filed actually get heard by the Court each year.
231
  In those cases 
where plaintiffs have been successful, the facts have been extreme,
232
 and human 
rights apply solely to individual humans, so any case which relates to the protection 
of the environment generally, or to the protection of animal or plant species, is 
outside the scope of the ECHR.
233
  Moreover, a case brought before the ECHR can 
take several years to come to fruition.
234
  Under the precautionary principle, the law 
should strive to prevent environmental harm before it occurs, and if a plaintiff must 
wait 13 years for a remedy, as Giacomelli did, a substantial harm will likely have 
already occurred.  Therefore, the ECHR should be viewed as a last resort for a 
plaintiff trying to remedy an environmental harm; indeed, the ECHR requires all 
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domestic remedies be exhausted before it hears a case.
235
  It may serve as a safety net 
for plaintiffs who have no other legal options, but because so few cases are heard by 
the Court, and because those cases that were successful were so egregious in their 
facts, the ECHR should not be relied upon by citizens to resolve their environmental 
disputes.   
D.  How RCRA Was Applied to the WTI Facility  
This section will discuss how the District and Circuit Courts applied, and 
misapplied, the RCRA statute to the two citizen endangerment suits brought against 
the WTI facility.   
1.  Palumbo v. West Technologies Industries 
Michael Palumbo, the Attorney General of the State of West Virginia, brought 
Palumbo v. Waste Tech. Industries on behalf of the citizens of the State of West 
Virginia, joined by City of Chester, West Virginia.
236
  The City of Chester is located 
directly across the Ohio River from WTI.
237
  The case came before the District Court 
in the Northern District of West Virginia.
238
  Plaintiffs alleged, among other things, 
that the facility was not built in accordance with flood plain standards, and that the 
levels of lead and sulfur dioxide emissions allowed under the RCRA permit, 
combined with the unregulated emissions of phosgene gas, would endanger human 
health and the environment.
239
  WTI responded with a motion to dismiss, claiming 
the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.
240
  The district court denied the 
motion, reading the citizen suit provision as providing the district court‟s jurisdiction 
where there are allegations, acts or omissions may present an imminent and 
substantial endangerment to health or the environment.
241
  The district court certified 
the jurisdictional question for interlocutory appeal, and proceeded to hear the 
plaintiffs‟ case while the appeal was pending.242 
During the case on the merits, plaintiffs presented experts on public health who 
criticized the facility‟s location near residences and an elementary school.243  WTI, 
the USEPA, and the OEPA argued that compliance with the terms of the permits 
would adequately protect human health.
244
  The district court ruled in favor of WTI 
and denied the plaintiffs‟ request for a preliminary injunction to halt operations at 
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the facility.
245
  Plaintiffs appealed the decision to the Fourth Circuit Court of 
Appeals.
246
  Before the appeal could proceed, the Circuit Court ruled on the 
jurisdictional question that had been the basis of the defendants‟ interlocutory 
appeal.
247
 
a.  The Fourth Circuit Misapplied the Administrative Procedure Act 
The Fourth Circuit determined that the RCRA endangerment suit was not 
appropriate and that plaintiffs‟ case was nothing more than a collateral attack on the 
USEPA‟s decision to issue WTI a permit.248  The court emphasized that Congress 
provided circuit courts exclusive jurisdiction over appeals from agency decisions, 
leaving the district court without jurisdiction in this case.
249
  Under the 
Administrative Procedure Act, an appeal of a final agency decision is brought before 
the circuit courts with a standard of review deferential to agency expertise.
250
 The 
court reasoned that plaintiffs who brought suits in district court as RCRA 
endangerment suits would be able to avoid the deferential standard circuit courts 
apply in an agency appeal.
251
   
The Fourth Circuit‟s reasoning in this case is contrary to the clear language of the 
statute.  The statute states that “any action . . . shall be brought in the district court 
for the district in which the alleged violation occurred or the alleged endangerment 
may occur.”252  The Fourth Circuit erroneously treated an appeal of a USEPA 
permitting decision as analogous to a RCRA citizen suit action.  The doctrine of res 
judicata applies when a case is substantially identical to a cause of action that has 
already been decided,
253
 but because different aspects of the facility were being 
challenged during the endangerment suit than during the permit process, this 
doctrine should not have applied.  A RCRA citizen suit raises issues that are not 
addressed during the USEPA permitting process because the permit process does not 
always address concerns about human health.
254
  
Additionally, the Administrative Procedure Act that the Fourth Circuit refers to 
was passed in 1946
255
 while the RCRA citizen suit provision was passed as part of 
the Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments Act in 1984.
256
  Being aware of its 
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prior legislation, Congress chose to provide citizens with the endangerment suit as 
an additional remedy from environmental harms than that provided by the 
Administrative Procedures Act.  “Congress‟ consistent provision for citizen suits in 
environmental legislations „evince[s] a legislative intent that “citizen[s] are not to be 
treated as nuisances or troublemakers but rather as welcome participants in the 
vindication of environmental interests.”‟”257  While the court may not see any 
evidence that Congress intended to eviscerate the permitting process it established,
258
 
RCRA itself seems to provide adequate evidence that it did.  Congress passed the 
endangerment suit provision providing exclusive jurisdiction to the district courts
259
 
and offered a distinct and separate cause of action than that provided under the 
Administrative Procedures Act.  Congress‟ clear intent was that district courts should 
have jurisdiction over endangerment claims brought under RCRA. 
b.  The Fourth Circuit Misapplied the Burford Doctrine 
The court went on to dismiss all counts where the plaintiffs challenged the 
decisions of the OEPA by inappropriately applying the Burford abstention 
doctrine.
260
  In 1983, the Sixth Circuit, ruling on another RCRA case, explained that 
Burford is not appropriate merely because resolving the question at hand may 
overturn state policy.
261
  The state must have an overriding interest in the case and 
federal review would disrupt the state‟s efforts in establishing a coherent policy.262   
Federal courts should not abstain from hearing cases merely because the law is 
difficult to determine.
263
  In RCRA suits, the federal and state agencies share 
jurisdiction with federal law dictating the environmental standards and state 
regulations supplementing enforcement.  In fact, RCRA contemplates a federal-state 
partnership for enforcement where a state hazardous waste program becomes 
authorized by the USEPA.
264
  Additionally, the objective of the RCRA statute is to 
“promote the protection of health and the environment” through “a cooperative effort 
among the Federal State and local governments.”265  This cooperation places 
                                                          
 257 Greenpeace, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5001, at *12 (quoting Proffitt v. Comm‟rs of 
Bristol, 754 F.2d 504, 506 (3d. Cir. 1985) (quoting Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 535 F.2d 
165, 172 (2d Cir. 1976)). 
 258 Palumbo, 989 F.2d at 162. 
 259 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(2). 
 260 James L. Buchwalter, Propriety of Federal Court’s Abstention, Under Burford v. Sun 
Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 63 S. Ct. 1098, 87 L. Ed. 1424 (1943), as to Claim that State of Local 
Statute or Regulation, or Application Thereof, Violates Federal Constitution or Conflicts with 
Federal Statute or Regulation—Land Use and Zoning Issues, 30 A.L.R. FED. 2D 285, § 5 
(2010). 
 261 Ada-Cascade Watch Co. v. Cascade Res. Recovery, Inc. 720 F.2d. 897, 903 (6th Cir. 
1983). 
 262 Id. 
 263 Ibarra v. Bexar Cnty. Hosp. Dist., 86 F.R.D. 346, 349 (W.D. Tex. 1979) 
 264 Families Concerned About Nerve Gas Incineration v. U.S. Dep‟t of the Army, 380 F. 
Supp. 2d 1233, 1237 (N.D. Ala. 2005). 
 265 42 U.S.C. § 6902. 
218 THE GLOBAL BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2:193 
 
concerns raised under RCRA within the jurisdiction of federal courts.  Applying the 
Burford abstention doctrine in cases such as this would provide defendants an “end 
run around RCRA” by opposing cases as being barred by this doctrine.266   
2.  Greenpeace v. Waste Technologies Industries 
On January 12, 1993, Greenpeace and eight local Ohio citizens brought this 
case
267
 before federal District Judge Ann Aldrich in the Northern District of Ohio, 
just 48 hours before WTI was scheduled to begin the trial burn period.
268
  Under 
normal circumstances, after a test burn is completed, a facility would then enter a 
post-test burn period where it is permitted to burn hazardous waste pending the 
outcome of the test burn results.
269
  This period may last as long as one to two 
years.
270
  Specifically, plaintiffs argued that the facility would pose an endangerment 
to human health and the environment because of indirect exposure to dioxin 
emissions through the food chain.
271
  Because plaintiffs brought this case under the 
citizen suit provision of RCRA, the district court‟s inquiry was limited to whether 
the incinerator posed “an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the 
environment.”272  The plaintiffs were unable to introduce direct evidence as 
regarding the siting of WTI.
273
   
After considering testimony from USEPA officials, scientists, and others, Judge 
Aldrich ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, finding that the facility did pose an imminent 
and substantial endangerment to the health and the environment.
274
  The court found 
that releases from the facility would likely cause an additional 4 cancer deaths per 
100,000 residents per year, stating: 
This risk for one year of emissions is four times higher than any 
analogous acceptable risk for lifetime emissions.  When this is considered 
along with the non-cancer effects, this Court finds it clear that the 
operation of the WTI facility during the post trial burn period clearly may 
cause imminent and substantial endangerment to health and the 
environment.  It is patently unsafe to subject the population exposed to the 
facility's emissions to the risks involved in incineration while the USEPA 
determines what the risk is and what risk is acceptable.
275
 
In its ruling dated March 5, 1993, the court held that WTI would be permitted to 
operate during the eight-day test burn period because the risk from such a short burn 
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period would not be as great.
276
  But the district court did order an injunction barring 
the facility from operating during the post-test burn period.
277
  Opponents of this 
facility viewed the ruling as a major victory,
278
 but their celebration was short lived.   
Judge Aldrich‟s ruling was appealed by WTI to the Sixth Circuit Court of 
Appeals on March 8, 1993.  WTI requested an emergency stay of the district court‟s 
order.  On March 16, 1993, just 11 days after the lower court‟s ruling, the Sixth 
Circuit granted WTI‟s request.279  In April 1993, WTI began burning hazardous 
waste after the OEPA authorized limited operations.
280
 
The Sixth Circuit entered its ruling in favor of WTI on November 19, 1993.
281
  
The Sixth Circuit found that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to 
hear the case.
282
  In its opinion, the Sixth Circuit focused on the timing of the suit 
and noted that there was nothing to indicate that the dioxin risk was something that 
could not have been raised at any of the numerous prior proceedings.
283
  Instead, the 
Sixth Circuit suspected that the plaintiffs had waited to bring the case before the 
district court, rather than take advantage of other administrative options, in order to 
bring the case before what they believed would be a more favorable forum.
284
  The 
court also followed the reasoning of the Fourth Circuit in Palumbo, which ruled the 
RCRA citizen suit was nothing more than a collateral attack on the USEPA decision 
to issue WTI a permit.
285
   
The Sixth Circuit failed to take into account that dioxin emissions are not directly 
regulated under RCRA.
286
  Because dioxin emissions were not considered by the 
USEPA when issuing RCRA permits, an attack on dioxin emissions cannot be a 
collateral attack and res judicata does not apply.  The Sixth Circuit erroneously 
determined that the plain language of the statute made it clear that the RCRA citizen 
suit was not to be used to challenge a permitted facility.
287
  But the Sixth Circuit‟s 
interpretation of the statute is circular.   
If no cause of action can be brought against a permitted facility, then there would 
be no need for Congress to expressly provide for suits against facilities that pose an 
“imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment.”288  The Sixth 
Circuit incorrectly combined permit suits and endangerment suits into one single 
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cause of action.  A suit against a non-permitted facility is already provided for under 
the first cause of action.  Because Congress expressly provided for permit suits as a 
separate cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(A), this should lead courts to 
the interpretation that actions against permitted facilities are permitted under 42 
U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B) as a separate and distinct cause of action.  Therefore, the 
Sixth Circuit‟s interpretation that endangerment suits cannot be brought against a 
permitted facility is against the clear intent of Congress. 
E.  How Europe Would Have Handled the WTI Case 
If WTI had been located within the EU, the outcome of the citizen suits would 
probably have been different.  The EU‟s adoption of the precautionary principle 
would have the effect of shifting the burden of proof to the facility, requiring the 
facility to prove that it is safe rather than citizens being required to prove that the 
facility is unsafe.
289
 
Moreover, the EU has the ECJ in place to oversee legal battles that occur 
between states.  In the U.S., West Virginia was left to sue on behalf of its citizens in 
the Ohio Supreme Court.
290
  In its suit before the Ohio Supreme Court, West 
Virginia was challenging the site of the facility which was controlled by zoning.  As 
discussed above, zoning is under the purview of the state so zoning decisions must 
be challenged in state court.  It is far more likely that West Virginia would have 
received an unbiased judicial opinion if it had been able to bring its case before a 
completely impartial court of the sort embodied by the ECJ.
291
  It seems to be asking 
a great deal of the judges of any state to oversee impartially a dispute between their 
own state and another.
292
  And, as a practical matter, the state judges overseeing 
these disputes must second-guess the decisions of state, county, or local officials, 
some of whom may have helped get them elected.  Impartiality, and perhaps as 
importantly, the appearance of impartiality, gives the EU an advantage over the U.S. 
in settling disputes between states that cannot be removed to U.S. federal courts.  
But it is the ECHR that has been willing to use the power of judicial 
interpretation to protect the environment.  In the RCRA statutes, the U.S. has on its 
face an extremely environmentally friendly set of laws.
293
  It is the interpretation of 
RCRA by the U.S. Courts that have denied citizens the right to a safe and healthy 
environment.  Although the EU is arguably much more progressive in its protection 
of the environment than the U.S., it continues to limit itself through the use of 
directives rather than regulations to legislate environmental concerns.  The ECHR, in 
contrast, has put the right to a safe and healthy environment among the other human 
rights the citizens of all Member States are entitled to.   
Had the WTI plaintiffs been able to bring their case before the ECHR, there is a 
real possibility they would have been successful.  The WTI plaintiffs could have 
brought the suit claiming the facility violated Article 8, the right to respect for home 
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and private life,
 294
  because of the how close the facility sat to nearby residences.
295
  
The suit may also have been brought under Article 2, the right to life, because of the 
health dangers WTI‟s releases of dioxin posed.296 In the Giacomelli case discussed 
above, the Italian authorities argued that it had not been proven that the facility was 
dangerous.
297
  In much the same way, WTI argued that the USEPA had not proven 
that their facility was dangerous.
298
  Again in Giacomelli, the ECHR ruled that 
authorities must not wait for comprehensive data for each and every aspect of the 
matter to act and found in favor of Giacomelli.
299
  The ECHR generally rules for 
plaintiffs in environmental suits only in cases that contain extreme facts,
300
 but the 
WTI case is extreme in its facts.  Certainly the District Court for the Northern 
District of Ohio found it was when Judge Alrich ruled the WTI facility posed an 
imminent and substantial endangerment to the human health of the citizens of East 
Liverpool.
301
  Therefore, if the WTI facility had been built in Europe, citizens faced 
with a threat to their health and their environment would have had greater legal 
remedies than citizens of the U.S. because of the presence of the ECHR. 
F.  The Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
Although it may not be as established or as well-known as its European counter-
part, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) rules on human rights 
cases in the Americas.  The IACHR is part of the Organization of American States 
(OAS), which also includes an Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.
302
  
The United States was one of the 21 original members to ratify the Charter of the 
OAS in 1948.
303
  The OAS now includes all the states of North America, Central 
America, South America, and the Caribbean.
304
  The Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights (IA Commission) is an autonomous organ of the OAS and is based in 
Washington, D.C.
305
  Composed of seven independent human rights experts, the IA 
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Commission has strived to promote the observance of human rights since 1959.
306
  
The IA Commission does not have any enforcement authority but rather it holds 
hearings on petitions and then submits cases to the IACHR for enforcement.
307
  Like 
the ECHR, the IA Commission requires the exhaustion of domestic remedies before 
it will hear a case.
308
 
Citizens may bring a case before the IACHR by submitting a petition against a 
state to the IA Commission, either a general petition or a collective petition.
309
  A 
general petition allows for citizens to bring cases where human rights violations are 
widespread and not limited to one incident or one individual, while a collective 
petition can be filed where there a numerous victims of a specific incidence or 
specific practice.
310
  These petitions may be brought by either an individual victim or 
by a third party, either with or without the victim‟s knowledge.311  The IA 
Commission will hear the case in two phases.
312
  During the first phase, the IA 
Commission determines whether the petition meets all procedural requirements and 
whether jurisdiction is appropriate.
313
  If all requirements of the first phase are met, 
the case moves on to the second phase where the case will be considered on the 
merits.
314
  The IA Commission will consider evidence, hold hearings, and ultimately 
determine state culpability.
315
  At this point the IA Commission may turn the case 
over to the IACHR for enforcement, but only if the state involved is a party to the 
American Convention on Human Rights and has submitted to the jurisdiction of the 
IACHR.
316
   
The Inter-American Court on Human Rights does not expressly recognize the 
right to a healthy environment but, much like the ECHR, the IACHR has expressed a 
willingness to expand other rights to cover environmental harms.
317
  The Case of the 
Saramaka Community v. Suriname was brought in 2007 alleging a human rights 
violation caused by the environmental effects of a mining operation.
318
  The plaintiff 
lost on procedural grounds, and while the IACHR did not take the opportunity to 
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address the issue of environmental human rights, it also did not deny the right to a 
safe environment.
319
  Environmental issues have been raised in other factual settings, 
such as when an environmental activist was murdered because of her activities, but 
there has yet to be case on point deciding whether an environmental danger on its 
own violates human rights.
320
   
There is one U.S. case currently pending before the Commission concerning 
environmental rights.  The City of Mossville, Louisiana is a community founded in 
the 1800‟s and consists almost entirely of African-American residents.321   The 
community is “now surrounded by at least 14 industrial facilities, nine of which that 
have admitted to polluting the environment.”322  The town‟s residents have three 
times as much dioxin in their bodies as the general population.
323
  At one point the 
town had to be evacuated when there was an underground leak of a toxic chemical 
from one of the plants.
324
  The plaintiffs in the case allege they are the victims of 
environmental racism.
325
  To get their case before the IA Commission, the plaintiffs 
had to argue that there was no U.S. law that could provide them with an adequate 
remedy to satisfy the requirement that all domestic remedies be exhausted.
326
  The 
Commission has decided that it will hear the case, marking this as the first U.S. 
environmental rights case the IA Commission has considered.
327
  To date there has 
been no ruling on the merits.
328
   
Unfortunately for the Mossville plaintiffs, any decision made by the IA 
Commission against the U.S. would not be enforceable.
329
  Because the U.S. is a 
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member of OAS, human rights cases can be brought before the IA Commission.
330
 
For the IACHR to enforce a ruling, the state must have acceded jurisdiction by 
ratifying the American Convention on Human Rights.
331
  The U.S. has not ratified 
any Inter-American human rights treaty.
332
  For U.S. plaintiffs, this means that the 
IA Commission is the farthest their case can progress and the IACHR will not be 
able to hear it.
333
  But because there has never been a case against the U.S. before, it 
is not clear as a practical matter whether or not the U.S. would comply with a ruling 
against it by the IA Commission.  If nothing else, bringing a case before the IACHR 
or the Commission can have a significant media impact and possibly bring national 
attention to the plaintiffs‟ cause.334  If there is an increased public awareness of the 
IA Commission and the IACHR within the U.S., the Inter-American Human Rights 
system may become a powerful tool in influencing public policy. 
G.  WTI Before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
The residents of East Liverpool should consider bringing their case to the 
attention of the Inter-American Human Rights System.  East Liverpool and 
Mossville share factual similarities which make it likely that the IA Commission 
would accept the WTI case.  The residents of East Liverpool are exposed to dioxin 
released through incineration which then ends up in the bloodstreams of individuals, 
while Mossville residents have blood dioxin levels three times higher than the rest of 
the population.
335
  Both locations are rural areas inhabited primarily by poor, black 
residents.
336
  And in both locations industrial facilities releasing dangerous pollutants 
are located adjacent to residences.
337
  The East Liverpool residents could argue, 
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 332 Id at 30. 
 333 Id at 33. 
 334 In 2007, the IA Commission created some media buzz within the legal community when 
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http://www.law.columbia.edu/center_program/human_rights/InterAmer/GonzalesvUS (last 
visited Apr. 27, 2011). 
 335 See discussion infra Section D; Press Release, Columbia Law School, supra note 303. 
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much like their counterparts in Mossville, that the domestic remedies available to 
them in the U.S. were inadequate to protect their rights and could point to the flaws 
in their previous RCRA endangerment suits discussed above to support this 
argument.  Additionally, WTI is located near the East End of East Liverpool, a 
neighborhood made up almost exclusively of black residents.
338
  With a properly 
filed petition, East Liverpool citizens could bring a case against WTI for 
environmental racism before the IA Commission for a ruling on the merits.  
The IA Commission and the IACHR have been more and more willing to 
consider cases involving human rights violations stemming from environmental 
harms.  In 2009, the IA Commission agreed to consider a case alleging an 
environmental human rights violation stemming from Brazil‟s construction of 
numerous dams.
339
  The construction of the large dams by the Brazilian government 
harmed the environment and the indigenous people of the area who depended on the 
water to sustain their way of life.
340
  The IACHR has expanded the interpretations of 
the American Convention on Human Rights to include environmental wrongs in 
much the same way as the ECHR.
341
  Cases on environmental human rights are 
heard by the IACHR under the right to life, property, equal protection, the 
inviolability of the home, property, and due process.
342
  Additionally, the IACHR is 
very concerned with protecting the rights of individuals who rely on the land to 
provide food and a livelihood.
343
  East Liverpool is located in the generally fertile 
area in eastern Ohio and many of the people surrounding the city are farmers.
344
  
Pollution from dioxins, such as those released by WTI, become concentrated as they 
move up the food chain, making food grown in the surrounding areas potentially 
dangerous.
345
 East Liverpool is located in Columbiana County where nearly 40% of 
the land is agricultural.
346
 Because the IA Commission is sensitive to the needs of 
those that rely on the land, such as indigenous peoples,
347
 and because WTI poses a 
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potential threat to an agricultural way of life by polluting the land, the IA 
Commission may consider this in ruling in favor of the citizens of East Liverpool. 
East Liverpool residents would have greater legal protections if the U.S. ratified 
the American Declaration of Human Rights (Declaration).  By ratifying the 
Declaration, the U.S. would submit to the jurisdiction of the IACHR.
348
  Currently, 
U.S. cases cannot be brought before the IACHR and must stop at the IA 
Commission.
349
  Decisions made by the IA Commission are not binding.  If the 
IACHR had jurisdiction within the U.S. its citizens could have human rights 
violations legally enforced by an international body.  Oversight by an international 
body would provide U.S. citizens another level of legal protection that is not 
currently available to them.  With the Declaration as binding law within the U.S., 
U.S. citizens would have the same legal protections their European counterparts have 
enjoyed under the jurisdiction of the ECHR.   
IV.  CONCLUSION  
Endangerment suits provide an “„important set of checks and balances in the 
enforcement process[,]‟ . . . „giv[ing] the outcome additional credibility, which is 
particularly needed‟” given that government dishonesty can and sometimes does 
occur.
350
  In the U.S., the legal remedies Congress intended to provide for 
individuals faced with imminent and substantial endangerment to human health and 
the environment under the RCRA statutes were denied to the plaintiffs in the WTI 
cases.  Additionally, the U.S. has fallen behind Europe and other international bodies 
of law in the area of environmental protection and U.S. citizens do not have the same 
legal remedies against environmental harms as EU citizens.
351
  The right to a clean 
and healthy environment is also being incorporated into the fundamental human 
rights embodied under both the ECHR and the IACHR.
352
  The Fourth and Sixth 
Circuits misinterpreted the RCRA statutes by failing to allow endangerment suits 
against a permitted facility.  A step in the right direction would be for Congress to 
amend or replace this statute with a regulation that places higher restrictions on 
activities, such as the incineration of hazardous waste, that pose a threat to human 
health or the environment.  In amending or replacing the RCRA citizen suit 
provision, the focus should be on regulating the dangerous activity regardless of 
whether a facility happens to hold a USEPA permit.   
One way for the U.S. to place higher restrictions on dangerous activities and 
align itself with the environmental norms of Europe and other international bodies 
would be to adopt the precautionary approach to environmental regulation.
353
  This 
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principle would shift the burden to hazardous waste facilities to show that they do 
not pose a threat to human health, as opposed to the current regime which places the 
burden on plaintiffs to prove a facility poses a threat.
354
  Because there is always a 
degree of scientific uncertainty about the precise cause of any environmental or 
health effect, the evidentiary and financial burden placed on plaintiffs bringing 
environmental citizen suits to prove a facility is dangerous is often prohibitively 
high.  Another way for the U.S. to provide greater protection for its citizens from 
environmental harm would be to ratify the American Declaration of Human Rights.  
This would allow U.S. citizens to bring their case before the IACHR whose holdings 
would then be enforceable within the U.S.
355
  These actions would provide U.S. 
citizens with greater legal remedies against environmental harms which are currently 
limited by courts‟ narrow interpretations of the RCRA endangerment action.  By 
adopting the precautionary principle and the ratifying the IACHR, the citizens of the 
U.S. would be afforded the same environmental protections as the citizens of the EU. 
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